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Christopher George Pulman
University of Reading
  1.  35
    Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. By Mark Balaguer. (Cambridge, MS: MIT Press, 2010. Pp. 202. Price £24.95 hb, £12.95 pb.).C. G. Pulman - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):640-642.
  2.  70
    Hart on Responsibility.C. G. Pulman (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In the 1950s and 60s, H. L. A. Hart's writings were responsible for the revitalizing of legal philosophy in the UK and worldwide. This new collection of essays by distinguished philosophers and legal theorists addresses the enduring significance of Hart's work, focusing upon some of its more neglected aspects, including his work on causation and the philosophy of action. Two essays discuss Hart and Honore;'s Causation in the Law, a book that has been undeservedly overlooked in many philosophical discussions of (...)
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  3. 'Introduction'.C. G. Pulman - 2014 - In Hart on Responsibility. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  4.  16
    Jeffrie Murphy , Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion . Reviewed by.C. G. Pulman - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (1):57-59.
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  5.  15
    Kadri Vihvelin , Causes, Laws, and Free Will . Reviewed by.C. G. Pulman - 2014 - Philosophy in Review 34 (1-2):98-100.
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  6.  38
    Personal agency: The metaphysics of mind and action – by E. J. Lowe.C. G. Pulman - 2010 - Ratio 23 (2):232-236.
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  7.  40
    The Foundations of Agency.C. G. Pulman - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):123-134.
  8. Voluntary Interventions.C. G. Pulman - 2014 - In Hart on Responsibility. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  9.  53
    Where is the free agency in personal agency?C. G. Pulman - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):630-632.
    According to Jonathan Lowe's ‘Personal Agency’, free actions begin with a volition or act of will, which is itself a freely performed action. However, Lowe's explanation of why volitions are free actions is viciously circular: he argues that volitions qualify as free actions because they are rationally explicable, but claims that an action can only be rationally explicable if it is freely performed.
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